The landings at Leyte were meticulously planned by the Americans in coordination with Filipino guerrillas, who provided them with intelligence assessments and raw information. Small teams of Americans would also covertly scout the landing areas and the approaches to it in order to ensure that there would be no confusion or obstacles that would disrupt the invasion. Areas were designated for fire support with warships assigned to them in order to prevent Japanese beach defenses and reinforcements from compromising the beachhead to be established by the Invasion forces.

This was an easy landing, compared with most amphibious operations in World War II – perfect weather, no surf, no mines or underwater obstacles, slight enemy reaction. British observers on board a control vessel reported that “at first sight, the landing plan appeared complicated, but as regards the landing on Red beaches, the precision with which they were controlled was good to see.”

However, despite the pre-invasion planning, unforeseen or undetected terrain features and Japanese resiliency led to some losses [see "The Story of Hill 522"]. Some landing ships were grounded due to errors in calculating water depth; while other landing ships were damaged by Japanese mortar fire, despite preliminary naval bombardment specifically designed to eliminate enemy resistance. The Japanese used Hill 522 for a mortar emplacement, targeting Elmore's incoming landing craft.

The naval assault force assigned to Palo's "Red" and "White" Beaches was Task Group (TG) 78.1 (Palo Attack Group), commanded by Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey (USN) and the Embarking Army 24th Infantry Division, commanded by Major General F. A. Irving (US Army). Transport Unit (Transdiv 24) was commanded by Captain T. B. Brittain (USN) and was comprised of the following ships: Attack transports USS DuPage (APA-41), Capt. George M. Wauchope (USNR); USS Fuller (APA-7), Capt. Nathaniel M. Pigman (USN); USS Elmore (APA-42), Capt. Drayton Harrison (USN); USS Wayne (APA-54), Capt. Thomas V. Cooper (USN); attack cargo USS Aquarius (AKA-16), Cdr. Ira E. Eskridge (USCG); transport USS John Land (AP-167), Cdr. Frederic A. Graf (USN); and Landing Ship, Dock USS Gunston Hall (LSD-5), Cdr. Dale E. Collins (USNR).

The campaign for Leyte proved the first and most decisive operation in the American reconquest of the Philippines. Japanese losses in the campaign were heavy, with the army losing four divisions and several separate combat units, while the navy lost 26 major warships and 46 large transports and hundreds of merchant ships. The struggle also reduced Japanese land-based air capability in the Philippines by more than 50%. Some 250,000 troops still remained on Luzon, but the loss of air and naval support at Leyte so narrowed the Japanese army’s options that they now had to fight a passive defensive of Luzon, the largest and most important island in the Philippines. In effect, once the decisive battle of Leyte was lost, the Japanese gave up hope of retaining the Philippines, conceding to the Allies a critical bastion from which Japan could be easily cut off from outside resources, and from which the final assaults on the Japanese home islands could be launched